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CaseNc ).20030310-C \ 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Aggravated 
Robbers, ii firsl deyrce tHon in inl.iinm ni I mill i '(Hit uini o i> MI " i I'HIM), W \\\\ ,m 
enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Montiel's plea 
bargain because the trial coin t failed to consider all legally relevant factors, exceeded the 
limits prescribed by law, and applied lis discretion arbitrarily. 
Standard of Review: This Court ,freview[s] a trial court's acceptance or rejection 
of a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 
1JHM yoilltali i i /\(T I1' • 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Alex Montiel's (Montiel) argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting Montiel's plea agreement is preserved at Court Record (R.) 200 
(Pretrial Conference Transcript). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of 
the issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
United States Constitution Article I, Section 8 - The Legislative Branch - Scope of 
Legislative Power; 
United States Constitution Article II, Section 2 - The Presidency - Presidential 
Power; 
United States Constitution Article III, Section 2 - The Judiciary - Scope of Judicial 
Power; 
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1 - Distribution of Powers - Three 
Departments of Government; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) - Aggravated Robbery; 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) - Pleas. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Montiel was charged by information with one count of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), with an enhancement 
for committing the offense in concert with two or more persons, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002). R. 4-5. Montiel pleaded not guilty. R. 30. The State 
and Montiel reached a plea agreement and presented it to the trial court at a pretrial 
conference on December 13, 2002. See R. 200 (attached at Addendum,. C) I lie ti ial 
2002. See R. 201-203. Montiel was convicted of aggravated robbery with the gang 
enhancement and sentenced to ten years to life at the Utah State Prison, R 172-73. 
Montiel is currently incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the December 13, 2002 pretrial conference, the State informed the trial court 
that it had reached a plea agreement with Montiel. See R. 200:4. Under this agreement, 
Montiel agreed to plead guilty to a third degree felony charge in exchange for the first 
clegiTf fi/lriri) nhatut: hum (hopped, See K1 I he Mali e\pl nurd thai ill nns niki nip 
this plea because "there are some facts that... make the story not as presentable to the 
jury and I would rather accept the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)." LcL In 
response, the trial court noted the State had charged Montiel with a first degree felony 
with pant" ami fiieann ailiaiirniicnh ' and ,i,anl "Will I ill in I • '.live (in:.inns 
enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there was 
some mistake in pleading." Id. 
I >efense aiiin a I Illicit spoke, explaining that Ihur's .IIIMI (lie additional icanon 
1
 Use ot a dangerous weapon was actually an element of it le chai ged ci in le See 
R. 4-5; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (1999) 
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judicial economy." Id at 4-5. The trial court responded: 
I don't care about judicial economy when people are alleged 
to have used firearms in the commission of a crime. I'll take 
whatever time is necessary to resolve the issue properly. 
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement. 
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence^] that he 
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your 
witness is lying. 
Id at 5. 
Next, the State again explained the need for the plea agreement, saying, "It's just 
. . . a matter of weighing . . . the case. I mean, there are facts-that is the story that is told 
by the . . . complaining witness," but "sometimes it's better to have the . . . verdict in 
hand than . . . two in the bush. And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to 
heck with this and . . . they lose it." Id. The State continued, "I think this person is a 
dangerous person. My objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the State is to 
take this person, who[m] I believe to be a dangerous person, and lock him up." IdL_ at 5-
6. Responding, the trial court asked, "Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is 
that?" Id at 6. The State answered, "It's better than zero to zero," and explained that the 
plea agreement had been approved by the district attorney authorized to accept plea 
agreements in "short-term situation^]." Id 
Continuing, the State explained it had also talked to the alleged victim in regard to 
a previous plea agreement but not in regard to the current plea. Id. Interrupting, the trial 
court said: 
4 
Remember the case that Justice Wilkins wrote where he 
accused the District Attorney's office and the trial judge of 
running rampant over victim's rights by not telling them 
what's going on and that little fiasco out in Tooele? I don't 
think [the District Attorney] wants to have to undergo that 
again without at least an opportunity to look at this. I know I 
don ' t . . . . [W]e haven't even told the person who claims all 
these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think 
he's entitled to know. 
Iu, it 6 7. 
Finally, the trul i uurf ivjivlrd thr pk\i aprccmiml s<n in,1. "1 in mil gomj.? b .tllim 
the filing of this amended Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea 
to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard." IdL at 7, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section I: A trial court may only reject a plea agreement 1 
judicial discretion. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea 
agreement because it: (1) failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (2) exceeded the 
limits pi escribed lb) law , ai id (3) applied its disci etioi I arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion ^ \ nrejudiciah 
First, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement without 
considering all legally relevant factors. A trial court has a duty to consider all legally 
trln iinl liH'tnr hrlorr rrirdmj.1 i pirn .uyveinrnl I u fulfill llii iluh Ihr lri.il i unit 
must evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the particular 
bargain. In this case, the trial court did not evaluate the relevant circumstances of the 
5 
case or determine the propriety of the particular plea. Instead, it summarily rejected the 
plea based on its fixed policy that firearms enhancements should never be waived. 
Second, the trial court abused its discretion by exceeding the scope of its 
authority. A trial court must not usurp the State's right to prosecute. This is especially 
true in plea agreements because the State is in the best position to evaluate the propriety 
of a plea. Here, the trial court usurped the State's right to prosecute by rejecting the plea 
agreement based on its own fixed policy and ignoring the State's conclusion that the plea 
was necessary to insure incarceration time. Additionally, a trial court must not infringe 
on the separation of powers. Where a proposed plea agreement deals with charging, the 
trial court should only reject the plea to prevent abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Here, 
the trial court infringed on the separation of powers by second-guessing the State's plea 
decision even though the State exercised sound discretion in formulating the plea by 
considering public interest, Montiel's interest, and judicial economy. 
Third, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea arbitrarily. A trial 
court may not reject pleas on an arbitrary basis. In other words, a trial court should 
accept a plea unless it can identify good reasons for rejecting it. Here, the trial court 
rejected the plea arbitrarily because it selected one arbitrary fact, that Montiel was 
charged with use of a firearm, to justify a blanket refusal to even consider the plea. 
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion 
6 
was prejudicial. Rather than pleading guilty to a third degree felony, Montiel was forced 
by the trial court's abuse of discretion to proceed to trial where he was convicted of a 
first degree felony. 
Section II: Although Montiel properly preserved his claim for appeal, his claim 
would merit reversal even without preservation because the trial court's abuse of 
discretion was plain error. First, as discussed above, the trial court's rejection of the plea 
agreement was error. Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court 
because it rejected the plea based on its own personal policy rather than on any 
consideration of the facts or the law. Third, the error was harmful. If the trial court had 
considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case and given proper deference to 
the State's prosecutorial discretion, there is a substantial likelihood that the trial court 
would have accepted the plea. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MONTIEL'S CONVICTION 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REJECTING THE PLEA AGREEMENT2 
Plea bargaining "is an essential component of the administration of justice" and, if 
"[pjroperly administered," is "to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 
257, 260 (1971). Although there is "no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted," a 
trial court may only "reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello. 
404 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (explaining that a 
trial court "may refuse to accept a plea of guilty"); State v. Turner. 980 P.2d 1188, 1189-
90 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("We review a trial court's acceptance or rejection of a guilty 
plea under an abuse of discretion standard."). A trial court abuses its discretion if it "fails 
to consider all legally relevant factors," Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citation 
omitted); "exceeds the limits prescribed by law," State v. Bluff. 2002 UT 66,lf66, 52 P.3d 
1210; or applies its discretion arbitrarily. See State v. Chambers. 533 P.2d 876, 879 
2
 The limits of a trial court's discretion to reject guilty pleas are not yet clearly 
defined by Utah case law. See State v. Turner. 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (holding trial court abused its discretion by accepting defendant's plea "over the 
timely and specific objections of the State" because this "effectively nullified] the 
State's right to prosecute defendant"); State v. Mane. 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant's plea after 
he testified "that he had no memory of any of his actions" because "[n]othing in [Rule 
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires a court to accept a guilty plea 
and defendant has cited no case authority for that proposition"). However, this issue has 
been widely discussed in other jurisdictions. Therefore, this brief relies largely on case 
law from other jurisdictions. 
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(Utah 1975) (holding trial court's judgment "should not be disturbed" if its "discretion is 
reasonably used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary or capricious"). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Montiel's guilty plea 
because: (A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (B) it exceeded the scope of 
its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court should 
reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Consider All Legally 
Relevant Factors 
A trial court has a duty, before rejecting a plea agreement, to "consider all legally 
relevant factors." Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citation omitted). Inherent in 
this duty is the "obligation to consider seriously the proffered plea." Sparks v. State, 759 
P.2d 180, 184 (Nev. 1988). In other words, before rejecting a plea agreement, the trial 
court must "evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the 
particular bargain." Stacks v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) 
(quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by 
rejecting Montiel's plea without considering all legally relevant factors because it: (1) 
failed to evaluate the circumstances of the case, and (2) failed to determine the propriety 
of the particular plea bargain. 
1. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Evaluate the 
Circumstances of Montiel's Case. 
A trial court has the duty to evaluate the circumstances of a case before rejecting a 
9 
plea agreement. See Stacks, 372 N.E.2d at 1207. This means a trial court must 
determine, "in light of the entire criminal event and given the defendant's prior criminal 
record[,] whether the plea bargain enables the court to dispose of the case in a manner 
commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal charges and the character and 
background of the defendant." State v. Sears. 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000); s_ee_ 
also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B) ("The court . . . may not accept a plea until the court 
has found . . . there is a factual basis for the plea."); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 
164 (Ind. 1983) (holding a trial court has the "responsibility to determine the factual basis 
of the plea") (quotations and citations omitted)); State v. Hines. 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 
(Tenn. 1995) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a plea because it 
reviewed the facts and "felt that the facts of the case, even when mitigating 
circumstances were considered, should be decided by a jury"); State v. Reuschel, 312 
A.2d 739, 744 (Vt. 1973) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a 
plea because it reviewed the circumstances of the plea and found a "lack of factual basis 
for the plea"). 
For example, in Daniels, the appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by rejecting a plea because it "carefully considered the evidence presented at 
the guilty plea hearing and the presentence investigation report," was aware the victim's 
wife "wanted the plea agreement," "realized that a lot of people had put a great deal of 
time into arranging the plea," and "was concerned with affording the proper credibility 
10 
and respect to the death penalty statute." Daniels. 453 N.E.2d at 165. Conversely, in 
Sears, where the trial court rejected a plea because it was presented after the court-
imposed deadline, the appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion because it 
"summarily refuse[d] to consider the substantive terms of the agreement solely because 
of the timing of the presentation of the agreement to the court." Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 
868. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement 
without evaluating any circumstances of Montiel's case. Rather than considering the 
criminal event in whole or part, the trial court merely stated its belief that a firearms 
enhancement was applicable and summarily rejected the plea because it would not 
"waive firearms enhancements." R. 200:4-5. Accordingly, the trial court failed to 
evaluate any of the circumstances necessary to make a proper ruling on the plea bargain. 
For example, the trial court did not evaluate Montiel's character, background, or 
presentence report, as necessary to determine whether a plea bargain was appropriate in 
his case. See |dL at 4-7. The trial court also did not consider any evidence of the charged 
crime, thereby rejecting the plea without determining whether the facts of the case were 
conducive to a plea bargain. See. id Further, the trial court failed to consider the 
victim's actual desires. See id Although the trial court did ask the State what the victim 
thought of the plea bargain, it interrupted the State's answer and summarily concluded 
the victim disapproved. See id at 6-7. Finally, the trial court overlooked the time and 
11 
energy spent in creating the plea agreement and ignored the State's reasons for believing 
the agreement necessary. See id, at 4-6. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to consider any circumstances specific to Montiel's case. 
2. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Rejecting MontiePs Plea Without 
Determining the Propriety of the Particular Bargain Proposed. 
A trial court has the duty to determine the propriety of a proposed plea agreement 
before rejecting it. See Stacks, 372 N.E.2d at 1207; see also State v. Clanton. 612 P.2d 
662, 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) ("[J]udicial discretion implies the liberty to act as a judge 
should act, applying the rules and analogies of the law to the facts found after weighing 
and examining the evidence"). This duty requires a trial court to apply "independent 
consideration . . . in each case, and reject the use of fixed policies." State v. Hager, 630 
N.W.2d 828, 834, 835 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted) (explaining that "efficiency must 
always be compatible with fairness, and fairness must consider the fundamental 
principles which drive our system of justice and the rights and liberties of each 
individual"). 
For example, in Hager. the appellate court found the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting a plea agreement based solely on its fixed policy not to accept plea 
agreements reached after the court-imposed deadline. See Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 837. 
Instead, the trial court should have considered the case and determined additional 
reasons, beyond its fixed policy, for rejecting the particular plea proposed. See id.; see 
also Hockadav v. United States. 359 A.2d 146, 148-49 (D.C. 1976) (holding trial court 
12 
abused its discretion by making a "blanket refusal" to hear discussion on a proposed 
plea). 
Similarly, in this case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to determine 
the propriety of the proposed plea bargain. The trial court created a fixed policy that it 
would not "waive firearm enhancements." R. 200:4-5. It then used this fixed policy to 
cast a blanket rejection over Montiel's plea without ever considering the plea's particular 
propriety. See kL In other words, the trial court rejected the plea without ever 
determining whether the plea was appropriate. 
For example, the trial court did not determine whether the plea was appropriate in 
light of the entire charged crime. See Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 867 (holding a trial court must 
determine, "in light of the entire criminal event... whether the plea bargain enables the 
court to dispose of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the 
criminal charges and the character and background of the defendant"). It also did not 
determine whether the plea was appropriate under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Specifically, it did not determine whether there was a factual basis for the 
plea or whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
Further, it did not determine whether the State's reasons for entering the plea agreement 
were appropriate in light of public interest. See Section LB. Finally, it did not 
determine whether its own fixed policy against waiving firearms enhancements was 
appropriately applied to Montiel's case since Montiel was not actually charged with a 
13 
firearms enhancement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). Therefore, the trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to determine the propriety of Montiel's particular 
plea agreement. 
2$. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Exceeding the Scope of Its 
Authority 
Although a trial court has discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement, "the 
exercise of that discretion is circumscribed by the nature of the trial judge's role in the 
plea bargaining process." Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 148. The trial court must not, in the 
exercise of its discretion, infringe on the prosecutorial power of the State. See e.g., 
Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (holding trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea to 
lesser included offense "over the timely and specific objections of the State was unfair 
and unreasonable, effectively nullifying the State's right to prosecute defendant on the 
[greater offense] charge"). In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by infringing 
on the State's prosecutorial power because it: (1) usurped the State's right to prosecute, 
and (2) disregarded the separation of powers. 
1. The Trial Court Exceeded the Scope of Its Authority By Usurping the State's 
Right to Prosecute. 
The State has a "right to prosecute" and has an "interest in an error free 
determination of the case." Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Inherent in its right to prosecute is the State's knowledge of how best to prosecute a case. 
See United States v. Ammidown. 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the 
14 
prosecutor "alone is in a position to evaluate the government's prosecution resources and 
the number of cases it is able to prosecute"); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 
1438 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which 
time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative 
strengths of various cases and charges." (citations omitted)); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist. 
Ct, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 1997) (same). 
Accordingly, because the State has the right to prosecute and is in the best 
position to evaluate a case, its decision to enter a plea agreement "is to be followed in the 
overwhelming number of cases." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; see also Sandy, 935 P.2d 
at 1151 (noting prosecutors have discretion to determine whether a plea should be 
accepted due to "insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the admissibility of certain 
evidence," "the need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain success or conserving 
prosecutorial resources, or any other separate factor necessitating acceptance of the 
plea"). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the State's right to 
prosecute. The State's attorney decided to enter a plea agreement because he had 
uncovered facts that made "the story not as presentable to the jury." R. 200:4. After 
"weighing the case," he decided the chosen plea agreement was best because it would 
assure Montiel, whom he believed was "a dangerous person," would be incarcerated. IcL 
at 5-6. He also considered "judicial economy" and spoke to the victim about accepting a 
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plea.3 Id. at 4-5, 6. He then obtained approval for this plea agreement from a 
supervising district attorney empowered to approve plea agreements. Id. at 6. 
At the pretrial conference, the State's attorney explained the need for a plea 
agreement to the trial court. See id. at 4-6. However, the trial court refused to consider 
the plea and entirely disregarded the State's reasons for the agreement. See id. at 4-7. It 
refused to acknowledge either the State's determination that the evidence was 
insufficient to proceed to trial or the State's fear of uncertain success if required to go to 
trial. See idL at 4-5, 7. Instead, it said it would not consider a plea agreement at all 
because it would not "waive firearms enhancements." Id. at 4. In fact, the trial court said 
the State, because it chose to plead a firearms enhancement, was "stuck" with it unless 
there was evidence to show "there wasn't a firearm or [the] witness [was] lying." IcL at 
4-5. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the State's right to 
prosecute. 
2. The Trial Court Exceeded Its Authority By Infringing On the Separation of 
Powers. 
The trial court's role in the plea bargaining process is governed by the separation 
of powers, which "mandates the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs and 
vice versa." Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437 (citations omitted); see Springer v. Government 
3
 It is not clear from the record whether the victim approved of this or any other 
plea agreement because the trial court stopped the State's description of its conversation 
with the victim. See R. 200:6-7. 
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of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (noting the separation of powers doctrine 
is "implicit" in the United States Constitution); Utah Const. Art. V, Sec. 1 ("The powers 
of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise 
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others."). "Plea agreements are not solely within the realm 
of courts." Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 834 (citations omitted). "While plea agreements that 
impact sentencing powers of courts generally fall within the discretion of the court, plea 
bargains which involve charging decisions are primarily within the discretion of the 
prosecutor."4 Id. (citations omitted); see also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437 (explaining that 
"charge bargains implicate executive discretion" and are "primarily a matter of discretion 
for the prosecution"). 
Accordingly, when considering a charge bargain, the trial court "does not have 
primary responsibility [of determining the appropriate plea], but rather the [secondary] 
role of guarding against abuse of prosecutorial discretion." Hockadav, 359 A.2d at 148 
4
 Although charge bargains "implicate the sentencing discretion of [trial] courts," 
"the court's sentencing discretion is implicated only as an incidental consequence of the 
prosecution's exercise of executive discretion." United States v. Robertson. 45 F.3d 
1423, 1438 (10th Cir. 1995). "In fact, a court's sentencing discretion is implicated in this 
situation in precisely the same manner it is implicated by prosecutorial decisions to bring 
charges in the first place, where prosecutorial discretion is nearly absolute." IdL_ "As 
such, charge bargains directly and primarily implicate prosecutorial discretion whereas 
judicial discretion is impacted only secondarily." IdL 
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(quotations and citation omitted); see also Robertson. 45 F.3d at 1438 (f![W]hile [trial] 
courts may reject charge bargains in the sound exercise of judicial discretion, concerns 
relating to the doctrine of separation of powers counsel hesitancy before second-guessing 
prosecutorial choices.11); Sandy. 935 P.2d at 1150-51 ("Judicial power to reject plea 
bargains serves to modify and condition the absolute power of the prosecutor, consistent 
with the doctrine of separation of powers, by establishing a check on the abuse of 
prosecutorial (executive) prerogatives." (citations omitted)). 
In fulfilling the role of guardian, the trial court has the authority "to assure 
protection of the public interest," involving: "(a) fairness to the defense, such as 
protection against harassment; (b) fairness to the prosecution interest, as in avoiding a 
disposition that does not serve due and legitimate prosecutorial interests; [and] (c) 
protection of the sentencing authority reserved to the judge." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 
622. Thus, the "judge may withhold approval if he finds that the prosecutor has failed to 
give consideration to factors that must be given consideration in the public interest, 
factors such as the deterrent aspects of the criminal law." Id. "However, trial judges are 
not free to withhold approval of guilty pleas on this basis merely because their 
conception of the public interest differs from that of the prosecuting attorney." IcL_ "The 
question is not what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether 
he can say that the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound 
prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion." Id.; see also 
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Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85 (same); Hockadav. 359 A.2d at 148 ("If no proper cause 
exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is obliged to accept it." (citation omitted)). 
Specifically, a "trial judge may not reject a plea bargain solely on the grounds that 
the plea prevents the judge from sentencing as harshly as he or she would like." Sandy, 
935 P.2d at 1151. This would afford "judges too much discretion to inhibit the role of 
the prosecutor." Id. 
For example, in Ammidown, the trial court rejected a plea agreement because "it 
found that the crime was so heinous and the evidence of guilt so overwhelming that the 
public interest would be ill-served by [the plea agreement], which it referred to as a 'tap 
on the wrist.'" Ammidown. 497 F.2d at 618. The appellate court determined the trial 
court abused its discretion because it rejected the plea agreement based on what it 
"independently considered best in the public interest." Id. at 623. Instead, it should have 
determined whether the prosecution's public interest determination was an abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 622-23. 
Similarly, in Sandy, the trial court rejected a plea agreement because it 
disapproved of the disparity between the punishment allowed under the original charge 
and the punishment allowed under the plea bargain. See Sandy. 935 P.2d at 1149. On 
appeal, the reviewing court determined the trial court abused its discretion because 
"disparity alone is insufficient to reject a plea bargain without evidence that the 
prosecution had no valid reason for not proceeding to trial." IcL_ at 1152. 
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In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by violating the separation of 
powers. The offered plea agreement proposed to lower the charge from a first degree 
felony to a third degree felony. See R. 200:4. Thus, it was a charge bargain that 
primarily implicated the prosecutorial powers of the State. 
Moreover, the State's attorney, in reaching the charge bargain, exercised proper 
discretion by formulating the plea based on public interest, Montiel's interest, and 
judicial economy. See id. at4-6. First, the State's attorney carefully considered public 
interest. See id at 4-5. After "weighing the case" and determining certain facts made the 
case "not as presentable to the jury," he decided a plea was necessary. IdL Otherwise, he 
concluded, he would not be doing his duty "to the taxpayers of the State" because he 
could not insure Montiel, a person "dangerous" to the public, would be incarcerated. I(L_ 
at 5-6. Second, the State's attorney considered Montiel's interest. See id. at 4. By 
entering a plea agreement with Montiel, the State's attorney offered Montiel the 
opportunity to forgo trial and take responsibility for the crime. See id.; see also Hager, 
630 N.W.2d at 833 (noting plea agreements allow "defendants who acknowledge guilt to 
spare themselves . . . an expensive trial"). Third, the State's attorney considered judicial 
economy. See R. 200:4-5. Using his superior knowledge of pending cases and charges, 
the State's attorney concluded judicial economy would best be served by pleading 
Montiel's case and freeing the trial court's schedule for other cases. See id.; see also 
Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 ("Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at 
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which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative 
strengths of various cases and charges." (citations omitted)). 
Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to accept the charge bargain because the 
State's attorney exercised proper discretion in formulating it. However, rather than 
accepting the State's proposed plea or even reviewing it for abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion, the trial court entirely disregarded it. See R. 200:4-7. Regardless of the 
State's determination that the plea agreement would serve public interest, Montiel's 
interest, and judicial economy, the trial court rejected the plea because it personally did 
not "waive firearms enhancements." LI at 4. This determination undermined the State's 
proper exercise of discretion and forced it to try a case that it believed was against the 
public interest to try.5 See id. at 4-6. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by 
infringing on the separation of powers. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying Its Discretion Arbitrarily 
A trial court may not "reject pleas on an arbitrary basis." United States v. 
Maddox. 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also People v. Jasper. 
17 P.3d 807, 813-14 (Colo. 2001) (same). Instead, it "must provide a reasoned exercise 
5
 The trial court's determination also prevents the State from fulfilling its duty to 
charge and prosecute other defendants involved in firearms crimes. Because the trial 
court will not waive firearms enhancements, it forces the State to choose between 
charging a defendant with use of a firearm and risking ultimate loss if it cannot present 
sufficient evidence at trial to show use of a firearm, and not charging a defendant with 
use of a firearm to preserve its ability to reach a plea agreement later. See R. 200:4-5. 
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of discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution 
and defense." Maddox. 48 F.3d at 558 (quotations and citations omitted). 
For example, in Maddox, the appellate court determined the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting the defendant's second plea agreement because his first plea had 
appeared involuntary. See IdL at 558-59. Instead, the trial court "was obligated to 
provide a reasoned exercise of discretion before rejecting [the defendant's plea again." 
Id. at 559 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Hockaday, the appellate court found the trial court abused its 
discretion by making a "blanket refusal" to hear discussion on a proposed plea solely 
because the "trial had been too much trouble." Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 148-49. The 
appellate court explained that, where "a disposition has been agreed upon by both the 
defendant and the government, the trial court must identify good reasons for a departure 
from following that course. If no proper cause exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is 
obliged to accept it." IcL at 148. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting Montiel's 
plea agreement. The trial court did not provide a reasoned exercise of discretion to 
explain why it was rejecting Montiel's plea or identify any good reasons for rejecting the 
plea. See R. 200. Instead, it applied a blanket refusal to consider the plea because 
Montiel was charged with using a firearm. See id. at 4-5. By selecting one specific fact 
at the expense of all other relevant facts to mechanically reject Montiel's plea, the trial 
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court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion.6 See id. 
Moreover, the trial court's arbitrary use of judicial discretion directly contradicted 
public policy. Plea bargains are encouraged because they Mafford[] the prosecutor 
additional leverage in prosecuting other crimes, and allow[] defendants who 
acknowledge guilt to spare themselves and the public an expensive trial.ff See Ha gen 
630 N.W.2d at 833 (citations omitted). However, under the arbitrary reasoning of the 
trial court, the State is automatically denied the leverage to plead cases whenever it 
alleges use of a firearm. Accordingly, the State must tread carefully, deciding early 
whether to allege use of a firearm and sacrifice the opportunity to plea, or not to allege 
use of a firearm and retain the opportunity to plea. Further, if the State chooses to allege 
use of a firearm, the defendant is automatically denied the opportunity to acknowledge 
guilt and spare himself and the public an expensive trial no matter how appropriate the 
proposed plea may be. 
More important, if this trial court is allowed to reject Montiel's plea agreement 
based solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms enhancements, then all trial 
courts will be permitted to formulate personal guidelines that automatically exclude 
6
 This is especially true because the one fact the trial court relied on, use of a 
firearm, was merely a charge. It was not yet proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see. State 
v. Topham. 41 Utah 39, 123 P. 888, 889 (Utah 1912) (M[E]very man is presumed to be 
innocent until proved to be guilty." (quotations and citations omitted)); and was not 
conceded in the proposed guilty plea. See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) 
(Robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) (Attempt). 
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whole classes of defendants from pleading guilty. If the trial court finds a certain 
criminal practice personally repulsive, then it can develop a policy and thereafter 
automatically prevent the State and defendants from pleading such cases no matter how 
appropriate the proposed pleas may be. See, e.g.. Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 867 (explaining 
judicial discretion is "'the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by 
law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances'" 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 467 (6th ed. 1990))). 
D. This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion 
Was Prejudicial 
When a trial court abuses its discretion by rejecting a plea agreement, the resulting 
harm is prejudicial because, "[b]y proceeding to trial," the defendant is "exposed to a 
greater possible punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." 
Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 149 (holding trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting plea was 
not "inconsequential" even though "the execution of the sentences was suspended"); see 
also Maddox, 48 F.3d at 560 (holding prejudicial error was "obvious" where defendants 
"were convicted of several offenses in addition to those involved in their plea 
agreements"). 
In this case, the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting the plea agreement 
was prejudicial. Because the trial court erroneously rejected Montiel's plea to a third 
degree felony, Montiel's case went to trial and Montiel was convicted of a first degree 
felony. See R. 172-73; 200:4; 201-203. 
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II. ALTHOUGH MONTIEL PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM 
FOR APPEAL, HIS CONVICTION MERITS REVERSAL 
REGARDLESS OF PRESERVATION BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS PLAIN ERROR 
Montiel's claim was properly preserved for appeal.7 See R. 200. However, 
regardless of preservation, this Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the 
trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court" are not preserved. State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74,1jl 1,10 P.3d 346 
(citations omitted). If a claim is not preserved, a defendant may not raise it on appeal 
unless he "can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Id (citation omitted). Plain error exists where: (1) there is error, (2) the 
"error should have been obvious to the trial court," and (3) the error is harmful. State v. 
Adams, 2000 UT 42,Tf20, 5 P.3d 642 (quotations and citation omitted). In this case, the 
trial court committed plain error. 
First, the trial court erred by failing to consider all legally relevant factors, 
7
 In this case, both of the policy reasons for requiring preservation are met. 
Preservation is required because: (1) "the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and (2) "a defendant should not be 
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,.. . claiming] on appeal that the Court 
should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74,f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and 
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Here, Montiel is not trying to overcome a 
failed strategical decision. Both he and the State presented the plea agreement to the trial 
court and attempted repeatedly to explain why the plea agreement was appropriate. See 
R. 200:4-7. The trial court then reviewed the plea agreement and, regardless of both 
parties arguments, rejected the plea agreement. See id at 7. Montiel now appeals the 
trial court's rejection of the plea agreement. See id. 
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exceeding the scope of its authority, and applying its discretion arbitrarily when it 
rejected Montiel's plea agreement. See Section I. 
Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Judicial discretion 
is '"the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or the equitable 
decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances.'11 State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 
863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 467 (6th ed. 1990))). In this 
case, the trial court did not hear any of the facts, consider any applicable law, decide 
what was just and proper under Montiel's particular circumstances, or consider the 
discretion of the prosecution. See. R. 200:4-7. Instead, it rejected Montiel's plea based 
solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms enhancements. See. id. at 4-5. 
Under these circumstances, it should have been obvious to the trial court that it was 
committing error by rejecting Montiel's plea bargain based not on the proper exercise of 
its judicial discretion but on the arbitrary exercise of its personal bias toward defendants 
who are charged with using a firearm. 
Third, the error was harmful. Error is harmful if "the likelihood of a different 
outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence 
in the verdict." Adams, 2000 UT 42 at ^20 (quotations and citation omitted) (alterations 
in original). If the trial court had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case 
and deferred to the State's prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the 
plea because Montiel was charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood 
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that the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement. See. United States v. 
Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the prosecutor's decision to 
enter a plea agreement "is to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases"). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement. 
SUBMITTED this L^ day of August, 2003. 
LOKfj. SEPPr" 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Date of birth: May 13, 1979 
Video 
Tape Number: 2/28/03 Tape Count: 9:25/9:37 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/18/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 021906524 
Date: Feb 28, 2003 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Restitution Ordered to victim for $45.00 cash & $150.00 for a ring. 
No credit for time served. Firearm and groug enhancement is 
included in this sentence. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Concurrent with case #021906084 
Dated this £.<% day of .3ZJLM^ /20 Q^?. \ 
:iMOTHY R. HANSON 
'District Court Judge 
Paae 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
United States Constitution Article I, Section 8 
Sec. 8. [Powers of Congress.] 
[1.] The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
[2.] To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 
[3.] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
[4.] To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 
[5.] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and foreign Coin, and fix 
the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
[6.] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and 
current Coin of the United States; 
[7.] To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 
[8.] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries; 
[9.] To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; 
[10.] To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; 
[11.] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
[12.] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that 
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
[13.] To provide and maintain a Navy; 
[14.] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces; 
[15.] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
[16.] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, 
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress; 
[17.] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular 
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the 
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in whiqh the Same shall be, for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Build-
ings; and 
[18.] To make All Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof. 
United States Constitution Article II, Section 2 
Sec. 2. [Commander-in-Chief — Pardons — Treaties — 
Appointment of officers.] 
[1.1 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into 
the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writ-
ing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any 
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have 
power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, 
except in Cases of Impeachment. 
[2.] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and 
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established 
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments. 
[3.] The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may hap-
pen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their next Session. 
United States Constitution Article III, Section 2 
Sec. 2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — 
Trial and places of trial.] 
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—[between a State and 
Citizens of another State;]—between Citizens of different States,—between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, 
[and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.] 
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
History: Const 1896. Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- VI. 
ment, Utah Const., Art. VII. Municipal powers not delegable, Utah 
Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII. Const., Art. VI, § 28. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be -in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight aRer the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1; 
1989, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of 
December, 2002, commencing at the hour of 9:15 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
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MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if we could call Montiel, 
No. 21 on your calendar. 
THE COURT: We can. Let's wait a minute until my 
clerk gets back. 
MS. BUCHI: Okay. 
THE COURT: We're on No. 21, Alex Montiel. State of 
Utah vs. Alex Montiel, this is Case No. 02190655—or 6524. 
It's on for final pre-trial. We have a trial on next Monday, 
I believe. 
MS. BUCHI: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have we got Alex Montiel? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We do, but he says he's 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: No. What he has to do is come out. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if I can approach. 
THE COURT: All right. You are Alex Montiel? 
MR. MONTIEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I take it from what you've 
handed me, we're going to trial next Monday? 
MS. BUCHI: We are prepared to, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The State ready? 
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MR. BURMESTER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel and the defendant here at 
9:00 o'clock. You'll have the appropriate attire for Mr. 
Montiel? 
MS. BUCHI: Yes, I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want everybody here at 9:30 
because I'll have the jury up here at 10:00 o'clock ready to 
go. 
I have the defendant's proposed instructions and 
proposed voir dire and if the State has any instructions, they 
can bring them first morning. 
Okay. Anything else we need to talk about in this 
case; 
MS. BUCHI: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: State have anything else? 
MR. BURMESTER: Nothing from the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: See you at 9:30 on Monday. 
MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. That's all that 
I have, 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Off the record. 
THE COURT: Ms. Buchi? 
MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. If we could 
return to the matter of Alex Montiel, we have a resolution. 
THE COURT: What's the plan here? 
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Give me the file back on Montiel, will you please, 
Evelyn? 
What's the reason we're doing this? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, there are a couple of 
reasons. The first is, there are some facts that are—make 
the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather 
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Well, you—well, you've charged him with 
aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and that—and the 
allegations, as I read the probable cause statement is that 
11 \ the defendant used a firearm, which would enhance that, and 
also that he committed a crime with four other persons, which 
would enhance that again. And—and the State wants to drop 
this down to a third-degree felony? 
Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. 
You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there 
was some mistake in pleading. And this probable cause 
statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to 
the victim's head and while he was being—while he was being 
robbed by the rest of them. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, there's also the additional 
reason that Mr. Montiel—Mr. Burmester and I have done prior 
to re-trial with Mr. Montiel, he was interested in knowing if 
there was any offer and I approached Mr. Burmester and we 
talked about it. I guess in terms of judicial economy as 
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well. 
THE COURT: I don't care about judicial economy when 
people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of 
a crime. I'll take whatever time is necessary to resolve the 
issue properly. 
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement. 
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he 
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your 
witness is lying. 
MR. BURMESTER: No, your Honor. It's just—just a 
matter of weighing—weighing the case. I mean, there are 
facts—that is the story that is told by the—by the 
complaining witness. 
THE COURT: And if it's true, it's a serious crime. 
MR. BURMESTER: Yeah. Absolutely. 
THE COURT: A bunch of guys jumped this guy walking 
down the road and put a gun to his head. 
MR. BURMESTER: Absolutely, your Honor, but there 
are also facts and as—as you're well aware with your many 
years of experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes it's better 
to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush. 
And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to heck 
with this and—and they lose it. 
I think this person is a dangerous person. My 
objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the 
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State is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous 
person, and lock him up. That is my objective and I think 
this is— 
THE COURT: Lock him up for zero to five, what kind 
of a deal is that? 
MR. BURMESTER: It's better than zero to zero, your 
Honor, and that's—that's just what I—where I'm at, I'm 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: I assume you've run this by Mr. Yocom? 
MR. BURMESTER: I've run it by Mr. Morgan. 
THE COURT: Is he the one that does those things? 
MR. BURMESTER: Yes. There—there is a part 
committee, but in the event we have a short-term situation, 
then it's— 
THE COURT: What does the victim say about this? 
MR. BURMESTER: I have not talked to the victim 
about this particular one, although I've talked to* the victim 
previously about offering a second (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Remember the case that Justice Wilkins 
wrote where he accused the District Attorney's office and the 
trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by not 
telling them what's going on and that little fiasco out in 
Tooele? I don't think Mr. Yocom wants to have to undergo that 
again without at least an opportunity to look at this. I know 
I don't. And I'm not (inaudible). We haven't even told—we 
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haven't even told the person who claims all these things 
occurred as to what are you going to do. I think he's 
entitled to know. 
I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea 
to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard. The 
case goes to trial Monday. 
MR. BURMESTER: Thank you, your Honor. 
MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm not sure if the 
Court cares, here's a witness list and I know the Court is 
concerned about that as alleged. 
THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you. 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I just didn't—this case 
is not the usual, so I did not prepared proposed voir dire. 
I—(inaudible) the Court stocks. 
THE COURT: I'm sure we can cover that. Thank you. 
MR. BURMESTER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: See you Monday. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
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best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 
of April, 2003. 
Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah, 
do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 7, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge, 
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except 
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings 
were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this „ day of 
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